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Introduction
In the United Sates, a patent is a set ofrights that allow an inventor to exclude others
form making, using, selling, or selling the invention. The patent system grants inventors a
temporary monopoly on their new technologies with the intention that the economic protection
will encourage others to invent and patent their inventions as well. In exchange for these rights,
the patent application must include a full disclosure ofhow others can make and use the
invention. When the patent term expires 20 years after it was filed, the technology enters the
pubtic domain and anyone can freely use the technology. Disclosure is not the only prerequisite
for obtaining a patent though. Applications are strictly scrutinized by examiners with the United
States Patent and Trademark Office who ensure that the invention meets the requirements of
novelty, non-obviousness, and utility. These requirements prevent the patenting ofa technology
that already exists or is a predictable combination of known elements.
Developments in the patent system have historically been driven by a variety of
economic and private interests. There are conflicting opinions about whether these interests can
be reconciled with each other and even whether or not patent law can effectively advance any of
its intended goals. In this paper, we will examine whether or not the modern American patent
law system achieve its goal of promoting innovation by analyzing it in accordance with the
natural law theory ofJohn Finnis's and other philosophical approaches.
Patents have always been an economic tool designed to promote technological
development and innovation. The most basic concepts ofpatent law can be traced as far back as
)
ancient Greece.l The earliest mention ofquasi-patent laws come from the ancient Greek city of
Sybaris where exclusive rights would be granted to creators of unique culinary dishes for a term
ofone year, however the accuracy ofthese laws and the degree to which they were actually
implemented is questionable.2
Modem patent law traces its origins most concretely the Venetian patent customs of the
15th century. Rulers in the Republic of Venice wished to stimulate the development of new
industries locally which would stimulate their regional economies far more than importing goods
would.r The granting of monopolies to individuals and companies provided an element of
security that incentivized them to assume what might otherwise be a tremendous commercial risk
when they invested their efforts to develop new technologies.a
This new quasi-patent system worked neatly with the existing system of guilds that made
up the loundations of commerce across Europe at that time.s Monopolies were granted to
practice their respective trades and any newcomers would have to seek a special license to make,
sell, or use their inventions or risk encroaching on the domains ofthe various guilds who had
already been granted a monopoly.6 The monopolies were largely granted on a case by case basis
before the implementation of a more structured system, with some grants going to individuals
other than the inventor and others being specifically designated as open to the public.T
I Phylarchus ofNaucratis, "The Deipnosophists, or, Banquet ofthe Learned ofAtheneus", Translated fiom Ancient
Greek by H.Bohn 12:20, p.835
2 Bruce Bugbee, The Genesis Of American Patent And Coplright Law l7-19 (1967)
r Ben McEniery, Pa tent Eligibility qnd Pltysicality in The Early History of Patent Lctw qnd Prd.rice, 38 U. Ark.
Little Rock L. Rev. 175, I8l (2016). (hereinafter McEinery History)
4 Id.
5 ld. at 182
6ld-
7 Id.
ln 1474 the Republic of Venice enacted what is widely regarded as the earliest general
patent statute.S It provides:
WE HAVE among us men olgreat genius, apt to invent and discover ingenious devices;
and in view ofthe grandeur and virtue ofour city, more such men come to us every day
from divers parts. Now, ifprovision were made for the works and devices discovered by
such persons, so that others who may see them could not build them and take the
inventor's honor away, more men would then apply their genius, would discover, and
would build devices ofgreat utility and benefit to our commonwealth. Therefore: BE IT
ENACTED that, by the authority of this Council, every person who shall build any new
and ingenious device in this City, not previously made in our Commonwealth, shall give
notice of it to the office ofour General Welfare Board when it has been reduced to
perfection so that it can be used and operated. It being forbidden to every other person in
any of our territories and towns to make any further device conforming with and similar
to said one, without the consent and license of the author, for the term often years. And if
anybody builds it in violation hereof, the aforesaid author and inventor shall be entitled to
have him summoned before any magistrate the said infringer shall be constrained to pay
him hundred ducats; and the device shall be destroyed at once. It being, however, within
the power and discretion of the Govemment, in its activities, to take and use any such
device and instrument, with this condition however that no one but the author shall
operate it.e
Though the language of the 1474 statute differs from our modem semantic structure,
most ofthe fundamental modem patent concepts are present.l0 First, there is a clearly stated
legislative intent that such a law will encourage more people to invent.ll Second, the requirement
that the invention be a "new and ingenious device" reflects the modem concepts ofnovelty and
E Walterscheid, Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution o/the United States Patent Lqw: Antecedents (Pqrt 5,
part ),'78 !. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 665 (1996). While it is generally regarded that the custom of
granting patents originated in ltaly, there is some question as to whether the practice began in Venice or Florence.
e Giulio Mandich, venetian Origins of Inventor's Rights, 42 J. OF THE PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 378, ( 1960):
ro McEniery, History. suprq at 184.i ld.
non-obviousness.12 Thirdly, the requirement that inventors "shall give notice of it to the office of
our General Welfare Board when [the invention] has been reduced to perfection so that it can be
used and operated" clearly reflects our modem requirement that inventions be useful and not
merely conceptual or speculative.13 In addition, the statute established grounds lor formal
registration, enforcement for infringement, and compulsory licensing to the state.la
The statute was considered a successl5 and undoubtedly played a part in Venice's rise to
prominence and its period of economic prosperity that lasted untit 1550.16 However, Venice was
also a major sea power at the time and controlled major trade routes which connected it many
ports around the Mediterranean.lT The discovery olnew trade routes around the cape ofgood
hope at the end ofthe fifteenth century shifted the dynamic in the Meditenanean which drove
many skilled craftsmen out olVenice and out into other parts olEurope.18 Taking their
knowledge ofthe Venetian patent system with them, the craftsmen helped to spread the patent
custom which resulted in emergence olpatent laws concurrently across Europe in the fifteenth
and sixteenth centuries.le
Ensland
The Venetian patent system inspired the Early English patent practice in much the same
way that English Patent law would go on to inspire the American system.2o The system was
similarly adopted in England to encourage development and to attract new trades to the region.2l
t2 Id.
t3 Id.
to ld.
I 5 Waf terscheid, 
"'l 
n t ec e de nts ( P qr t I ). supr a r,ote 3 4, at 7 l0 -
16 McEniery, History, suprq at 184-
11 Id- at 183
tB [d.
te Id.
20 Id- at 184
21Idl Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part I), supro note 34, at 700-01
This was done via "letters patent" from the cro*rt which awarded monopoly rights to provide
specific goods and/or services, often for an indefinite term.22 In the early history, however, this
practice was done mainly to attract foreign craftsmen with established trades to move to
England.23 This process continued into the reign ofQueen Elizabeth I whose economic policy
focused on promoting innovation by regulating in a way that encouraged creation ofnew trades
and industries as not interfere with existing trades.2a
The term "invention" did not have precisely the same meaning as it does in the modem
patent context. The phrase "to discover" was more closely aligned with the modem concept of
what it means to invent. Patents were granted to both inventors, as we understand that term, and
to those who were first to introduce the technology or art to England, usually by importing it
from another region.2s For that reason, the art did not have to actually be new at all and could
simply be new to England. The notion that the first person to import a new art was considered its
inventor became the rule in the early case klgebeny v. Stephens.26 This conception olinvention,
in combination with the desire not to interfere with existing industries, meant that patents were
mostly granted to immigrants.2T
While the patent granting policies ofQueen Elizabeth promoted the development ofnew
and useful arts in the country with some degree of success, many people felt that the monarchy
was abusing the power to grant monopolies to their allies or to those willing to pay for exclusive
rights.28 Queen Elizabeth I and her successor King James I were accused of granting monopolies
" td-
23 Id.
2o ld.
25 Id. at 185
16 Edgeberry v. Stephens establishes that'1he first introducer ofan invention practiced beyond the sea, shall be
deem-ed the-first inventor: and it is there said the act is intended to encourage new devices useful to the kingdom and
whether acquired by travel or study, it is the same thing."
27 McEniery, History, suprq at 18'7.
28 ld-
to persons who had neither invented nor imported any new commodities and were disrupting
industries that were already in full swing.2e In some cases the monarchy had granted monopolies
"over necessities such as salt, starch, saltpetre, paper, and glass, thereby harming the existing
trade in known commodities."so
Public outrage with the crown may have been without warrant as some argue that the
granting of monopolies was a scapegoat lor declining economic prosperity at the end of the
sixteenth century that is attributable to unrelated economic forces.3l Others have argued that the
crown had no incentive to "[t]he financial retums to the Crown were at the most negligible, and,
while it may be admitted that fiscal policy and the hope ofraising revenue were contributing
factors, they were not the main nor even an important motivating force."32 The criticisms did not
lall on deaf ears though, and the resulting struggle between Elizabeth I and Parliament ultimately
resulted in the revocation of many ofthe objectionable patents and a subsequent deference to the
common law courts to determine the validity olmonopolies granted by the Cror.l'n.r3
Fotlowing the Queen's abandonment of the crown's right to settle disputes arising from
patent grants, two common law cases shaped the landscape ofwhat the patent system would look
like moving forward. The first, Darcy v. Allen, involved a monopoly granted for the exclusive
right to manufacture, import, and sell playing cards.la The court offered no written opinion but
gave a verdict in favor ofthe defendant. Because no opinion was given, the argument ofdefense
counsel was published and interpreted as the reasoning of the court.35 The argument was that "as
2e ld.
30 ld.
3t ld.
32 Harold G. Fox, Monopolies And Patents: A Study OfThe History And Future OfThe Pqtent Monopoly (1947), At
188.
rr McEniery, Hislorj,, supra at 188.
34 [d.
35 Id. at 189
a rule, monopolies were stated to be generally contrary to law because they do not benefit the
realm, they raise prices, and they reduce the merchantability ofgoods and reduce
employment."36 Defendant specified though that an exception existed when the monopolies were
granted for a limited "reasonable" time.37
The second case, The Clothworkers of lpswich, involved a claim by a group oftailors
against another who was practicing in lpswich but was not a member of the corporation which
King James I had incorporated and chartered.rs The court stated that "the Crown could create
corporations with power to make ordinances governing trade, but the power granted did not
extend to the creation ola monopoly harmfut to free trade."3e The court reasoned that the crown
may grant a monopoly of limited duration to the inventor of a new trade as a form of
compensation for bringing it the kingdom at his own risk and cost.ao Monopolies could not be
granted in an preexisting industry and "are royal grants ofprivilege given solely for the purpose
ofachieving policy objectives based upon the common good."al
Statute of Monopolies
Darcy v. Allen was decided very sho(ly after the death ofQueen Elizabeth I but, despite
the outcome of that case, her successor, James I, largely continued her practice offreely granting
monopolies in preexisting industries that served his personal goals and those ofhis closest
aristocrats.42 King James faced a considerable amount ofpolitical pressure for these practices
and he took some measures to appease the public by officially recognizing the common law
16 Walterscheid, ,4rtecedents (Part 2), supra note 34, a|868.
3? McEniery, History, suprq at 189.
38 Id-
3e Id.
40 ld.
4t Id. at 190
42 Id.
principles outline in Darcy.a3 He was ultimately forced to revoke all existing monopolies and
declare that any further grants were to be done solely for projects ofnew invention.44
The English Parliament followed up by enacting the Statute of Monopolies in 1624.4s The
statute of monopolies reflected the common law principles of skepticism of monopolies but
recognized that the common good could be promoted via grants of monopolies of limited
duration.a6 The statute officially provided that all prior grants of monopolies were null and void.
Section 6 lays out the patent exception and the qualifications that must be satisfied in order for a
patent to be granted:
[Monopolies] shall not extend to any letters patents (b) and grants ofprivilege for the
term of fourteen years or under, hereafter to be made, of the sole working or making of
any manner of new manufactures within this realm (c) to the true and first inventor (d)
and inventors of such manufactures, which otlers at the time of making such letters
patents and grants shall not use (e), so as also they be not contrary to the law nor
mischievous to the state by raising prices of commodities at home, or hurt of trade, or
generally inconvenientaT
With the exception of adding a maximum of a fourteen year term, the statute carried over
existing concepts olnovelty and utility. While it was a tremendous development for the intemal
power dynamic between the monarchy and parliament, the statute did very little to alter the
common law principles that were already at play.
The passing of the Statute olMonopolies may not have changed much immediately in the
application ofpatent law principles but it helped to clarify the policy goals that Parliament
13 Id.
a5 Statute of Monopolies 1623, 2 I Ja. I , c. 3 (Eng.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/aep/Jal/2 l/3/contents.
a6 McEniery, History, supra at 190.
47 Statute of Monopolies
l0
intended to advance going forward. One olthe drafters, speaking after its passage, stated that
"because the inventor bringeth to and for the Commonwealth a new manufacture by his
invention, cost and charges, and therefore it is reason, that he should have a privilege for his
reward (and the encouragement ofothers in the like) lor a convenient time."a8 Even at such an
early time in the law's development there was an "an inextricable link between offerings of
rewards and incentives to bring new inventions to the realm."ae This reflects the strong quid pro
quo principle that drives patent law.
English Patent law continued to develop on its foundation in the statute of Monopolies
for over 200 years before the introduction ofany other significant patent legislation.50
Furthermore, the statute was never repealed and remained relevant until moved to a modem
patent system based on lhe European Patent Convention in 1977.51
Patent law is widety regarded as the legal foundation on which the industrial revolution
was built.s2 Many argue that, without patents, the culture of innovation that allowed the
industrial revolution to flourish might not have happened and the economic progress ofthe West
may have evolved very differently.53 With the Statute of monopolies in place and the modem
concepts olpatent law having taken shape, the industrial revolution's rampant technical
development brought about a need to clarily and solidifu the principles that would make patents
the effective promoter of innovation that they were intended to be.
a8 Edward Coke, The Third Part Of The Institutes Of England Concerning High Treason And Olher Pleas OfCrown
And Criminal Clauses, I 8 l, 184 ( I 797); (altered for readability) (explaining the reasoning behind the sort of
monopoly permitted by section 6 ofthe Statute ofMonopolies).
re McEniery, History, suprq at 192.
50 ld. at l9O:. referring to the Patent Law Amendment Act 1852 (UK)
51 Id.
52 Rufus Pollock, The luportonce of Pqtents for Innovation in the Industriql Revolution.
t3 ld.
l1
Consideration
In the early years ofpatent law, monopolies were granted in exchange for the creation of
a new industry or device in the region. The economic stimulation caused by the influx ofnew
technologies and arts was the value provided by the inventor. Additionally, the region would
benefit because the patentee would invest in the training of apprentices who would be able to
work in the industry after the expiration of the patent.5a Unlike modem patents, early grants did
not require any written or illustrated description ofthe invention.sj The patent system formalities
at time were only concemed with registration of the invention. Inventors simply paid the
registration fees and the patent was normally granted as a matter ofcourse.56
Even though no description was required, a lew ofthe early patent grants included a
specification.sT This was done by the inventors in attempt to clearly delineate the scope oftheir
monopoly. This practice proved to be beneficial for any inventor wishing to exercise their
monopoly rights and soon became a strong custom.58 By the middle of the eighteenth century the
British common law courts required every patent application to contain a specification which
would include a detailed description ofwhat the invention was and how it worked.se ln Liardet v.
.Iohnson, the courts clarified the standard that descriptions much reach:
The third point is whether the specification is such as instructs others to make it. For the
condition ofgiving encouragement is this: that you must speciry upon record your
invention in such a way as shall teach an artist, when your term is out, to make it--and to
make it as well as you by your directions; for then at the end ofthe term, the public have
51 McEniery, H.Jlorlr, supra a|193.
55 ld.
56 Pollock, sapra.
57 McEniery, History, supra at 194.
58 ld.
5e [d.
12
the benefit of it. The inventor has the benefit during the term, and the public have the
benefit after.60
From that point onward, the price a Patentee paid for his monopoly was not simply creating and
culturing a new industry but also providing to the public instructions for how to make and use
the invention.
Specifications meeting this standard were significantly more valuable consideration to the
region than simply practicing the invention as before. Now' everyone could use the invention at
the end of its term, notjust those who trained as apprentices ofthe patentee. The description
provided by the inventor was now the primary element ofconsideration and other elements were
secondary benefits.6l The benefit provided to the public was now much more tangible and not
speculative depending on the future actions ofthe patentee.
The industrial revolution was an period ofexplosive technological development and this
development was not limited to simply the creation ofnew gadgets. New and better techniques
for the manufacture ofgoods and raw materials were popping up everywhere. People began
filing patents for these new processes but, up until then, patents had only been granted for two
physical machines or chemical substances.62 This was the first in a tong line ofconflicts about
where the line would be drawn to decide what could be patented and what was too abstract.
By the industrial revolution, it was universally accepted that abstract principles and laws
ofnature in and of themselves were not eligible for patents.63 There was a recognition that these
60 Liardet v. Johnson 1778, See P. J. Federico, Origins and Early History of Patents, I I J. PAT. OFF. SOC:'Y, 294,
304 (1929); E. Wyndham Hvlfie, On the History of Pdtent Lqw in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, 18 L.
Q. R. 280, 285 (1e02).6i Boulton and Vr'att v. Bull ( 1795) 2 H. Bl. 463 at 472 (Eng.). Justice Buller declared that "[t]he specification is the
price which the patentee is to pay for the monopoly." Thejudgment.of Lord ChiefJustice Eyre also stated that "ttlhe
.odern 
"u.es 
haue chiefly turned upon the specifications, whether there was a fair disclosure." Id. at 491 .
62 McEniery, History, supro al 196.
63 ld.
l3
Elieible Subject Matter
principles need be applied in some way.64 The expression "any manner of new manufacture",
used in the Statute of Monopolies, implied for many that an invention needed to be a distinct
physical object.6s This was put to the test in Boulton and t|/att v. Bull, where the challenged
patent was for an improvement on existing steam engine designs. Watt's steam engine removed
the condenser element of the steam engine to a separate component to improve its function
which he claimed was an application of certain principles of nature.
The Boulton court was fiercely split but ultimately allowed the patent to stand with the
reasoning that "patent eligibility turns on a principle being reduced to a specific practical
application capable of producing effects that are of benefit to the public."66 The case was
relitigated sever years later and that court unanimously upheld the patent's validity however the
reasoning for such a finding was varied -67 In The King v. Wheeler, the patent in question did not
pertain to any new physical device. Instead, it was for a method of drying and preparing malt.
The court invalidated that patent for separate issues with its specification but the court
commented on the eligibility of the subject matter stating:
Now the word 'manufactures' has been generally understood to denote either a thing
made, which is useful for its own sake, and vendible as such, as a medicine, a stove, a
telescope, and many others, or to mean an engine or instrument, or some part of an
engine or instrument, to be employed, either in the making of some previously known
article, or in some other useful purpose, as a stocking frame, or a steam engine for raising
water for mines. Or it may perhaps extend also to a new process to be carried on by
known implements, or elements, acting upon known substances, and ultimately
6aBoulton and Watt v. Bull, Justice Heath took the view that the prohibition on patenting principles extends to
preclude patenting methods of production and even patents on the application of a principle.
65 McEniery, History, supra at 196.
66 McEniery, History, supra at 197.
67 Chief Juitice Kenyon troadly described the concept of manufacture as pertaining to, orthe equivalent of
,,something made by the hands of man." Justice Grose was of a similar view finding that the patent was "not a patent
for a mere-principle, but for the working and making of a new manufacture within the words and meaning of the
statute."
l4
producing some other known substance, but producing it in a cheaper or more
expeditious manner, or ofa better and more useful kind. But no merely philosophical or
abstract principle can answer to the word 'manufactures'. Something ofa corporeal and
substantial nature, something that can be made by man from the matters subjected to his
art and ski[[, or at the least some new mode olemploying practically his art and skill, is
requisite to satisfy this word.68
Here, the distinction between abstract principles and patentable subject matter are drawn in such
a way that patents for processes would be eligible.6e This construction aligns nicely with our
current concapts however the conflicting reasoning from the courts about this issue was cause to
a great deal of uncertainty about what exactly would qualifo.io
American Patent Law
The early days of United States of America coincided with the height ofthe industrial
revolution and, accordingly, the American Constitution recognized the importance of
incentivizing innovation through the grant of monopolies.Tr In A(icte I, section 8, the U.S.
Constitution declares:
"Congress shall have power. . . To promote the progress ofscience and useful arts, by
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries."T2
The clause also recognizes a need to balance the potentially stifling effect ofgranting monopiles
by necessitating Congress to make law which promote the "useful arts." The lramers ofthe
constitution used these specific terms in place ofthe term "manufactures" used in English law
because "the pkase 'new manufactures' [was] unduly limiting lor a patent system because it
68 The King v. Wheeler, ( l8l9) 2 B. & AId. 345 at349-52 (Eng.).
6e McEniery, Hisrory. supra at 198.
10 ld-
7t Id. at 199.
?2 U.S. Const. art. I, $ 8, c1.8.
l5
seemed to exclude new processes."73 The term "useful arts," as it is used here, can be read to
mean "technological arts" in the sense that Congress should use their legislative power to
promote technological advances.Ta
The first dedicated patent statute was passed approximately one year after the adoption of
the Constitution and was followed shortly after with a second. The Patent Acts of 1190 and 1793
drew heavily from the English patent tradition and incorporated many of its features.T5 Like the
English law, both statutes permitted a fourteen-year tenn and required inventors to file a
comprehensive disclosure with their application containing a written specification describing the
invention. Unlike the English law, the American system never permitted patents to be granted on
the basis of importation of a new technology.'u
The American system differentiated itself from that of the English by designating four
categories of eligible subject matter in the Patent Act of 1793. The definition has remained have
remained mostly unchanged since:
Any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement on any art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter.77
There is no evidence to suggest that the drafters intended for this definition to be more inclusive
than the English concepts but it certainly suggests that the scope of eligible material should not
73 Karl B.Lutz, Patents and Science: A Clarification of the Patent Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 18 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 50, 53-54 (1949).
7a Ben McEniery, Physicality and The Information age: A Normative Perspective on The Patent Eligibility of lVon-
Physical Methods, l0 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 106 (2010). (hereinafter McEinery Information)
75 Pennock v. Dialogue 27 U.S. l, l8 (1829). "It is obvious to the careful inquirer, that many of the provisions of our
patent act are derived from the principles and practice which have prevailed in the consffuction of that of England....
The language of [the patent clause of the Statute of Monopolies] is not, as we shall presently see, identical with ours;
but the construction ofit adopted by the English courts, and the principles and practice which have long regulated
the grants of their patents, as they must have been known and are tacitly referred to in some of the provisions of our
own statute, afford materials to illustrate it."
76 See Gibbons v. ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 58-59 ( 1824) (discussing thar patents are not awarded in the United states to
someone who is not an "inventor," excluding importers).
77 This remained essentially unchanged until 1952, when Congress amended $ l0l by replacing the word "art" with
"process" and defining that term in S 100 (b).
16
be narrower than that of England.Ts The use of "manufactures" in this definition demonstrates an
intention to incorporate the English principles but the inclusion of the other terms exhibits an
intention to clariff them leading to confusion about whether or not American system was open to
the patentability of methods and processes.Te These questions were left to be resolved primarily
by the courts which generally allowed methods that were applied to physical processes.s0
Since the adoption of patent law in America there have been several landmark cases and
changes that have effected what subject matter was eligible for a patent and in what
circumstances. The introduction and evolution of these concepts are further attempts to balance
the competing interests at play in the patent system.
Obviousness
Up until the late nineteenth century, patent law only required novelty.sl So long as it
hadn't been done before, and fit within one of the categories of eligible subject matter, a patent
could be granted for the technology. Common law courts in England began recognizing the
principles of Obviousness in the early 1900's.82 This concept, also known as the inventive step
requirement, requires that an invention be significantly more than an obvious modification or
combination of existing technologies.s3 Obviousness helps to strike the balance between benefit
of incentivizing invention and the cost of conferring a monopoly right by insuring that patents
are awarded to valuable discoveries and not simply to every superficial variation of known
78 McEniery, History, supra at20l.
7e Id. at 199. The 1793 Act explicitly included "any new and useful art," in the list of categories of patentable subject
matter, a usage that was carried forward until "art" was replaced with "process" in 35 U.S.C. $ l0l and defined in $
100(b) in 1952.
80 Id.
8r McEniery, History, supra at 202.
82 Id.
83 In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the Federal Circuit's "teaching,
suggestion, or motivation" proxy test as the only test for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C $ 103. The
Fe-<l-eral Circuit adopted this proxy test as an attempt to resolve the question of obviousness "with more uniformity
and consistency,, than would be possible under a straight application of the words in the statute. Id. at 134
t7
technologies. By 1952, the United States added Obviousness as a grounds for invalidity to its
patent law statute.8a
In 1980 the Supreme Court decided Diamond v. Chakrabarty, a case conceming the
patentability of living genetically engineered microorganisms.s5 This case clarifiedjust how
broad the scope of statutory subject matter was.86 The court stated that patentable subject matter
comprised anything under the sun that was made by man.87 However, just because patentable
subject matter couldbe anTthing made by man does not mean that it was everything made by
man since, clearly, abstract ideas were not patentable even though they could be articulated by
man.88 The Court did very little to help distinguish when something was an "unpatentable
abstract idea from a practical apptication ofan idea that is patent eligible."Ee
In 2008 the Court ofAppeals lor the Federal Circuit attempted to clarily the distinction
by implementing a "machine or transformation test" for patentable processes in In re Bilski.eo
Bilski's invention was a business method pertaining to the concept ofhedging risks and was
determined to be patent ineligible as was an abstract idea and failed the new test.er Here, the
CAFC's new test amounted to a physicality requirement that many criticized as being
84 United States Patent Act of 1952. 66 Stat.'197 (1952). Australia did it in 1952 also, UK did it in 1907
85 100 S.Ct. 2204. Claims were not outside the scope ofpatentable inventions merely because they were drawn to
live organisms.
86 [n choosing such expansive terms as "manufacture" and "composition of matter," modified by the comprehensive
"any," Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope'
87 The full sentenie in the Committee Reports reads, "A person may have 'invented' a machine or a manut'acture.
which may include anything under the sun that is made by man, but it is not necessarily patentable under section I 0 I
unless the conditions of [this] title are fulfilled.
E8 McBniery, lnformqtion. supra at I13.
8e Id.
eo Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 321 8, 3237-38 (2010) (Stevens, J , concurring)'
el The machine-or-transformation test required that an invention must either ( l) be tied to a machine or apparatus, or
(2) fansform an article into a different state or thing to be statutory subject matter'
l8
Modern Patentable
unsupported by the statutory language and contrary to existing precedent.e2 On appeal in 2010,
the Supreme Court upheld the ruting that the Bilski method was not patentable subject matter but
reversed the ruling with respect to the CAFC's new test. Going forward, the test would be a
helpful tool for identifying an eligible process but a process that failed the test was not
necessarily an ineligible one. This ruling confirmed unanimously that there was no requirement
olphysicality for patents but the Court gave no reasoning as to why the process was considered
an abstract idea, once again leaving the question unanswered.
The Supreme Court continued the trend ofpunting on the etigibility issue with a trio of
cases in the early 2010's. Mayo, Myriad, and Alice each attempted to clarify patent eligibility
standards but have done little to provide workable distinctions and have served mostly to
introduce more ambiguity and uncertainty.el Furthermore, the Court in Mayo introduced a
framework for analyzing claims that requires courts to "dissect" claims, which may be beyond
their technical capabilities, lurther complicating the process. This has caused many denials and
invalidations, particularly in the biotech field, which has left many patentees and practitioners
frustrated that are investing time and money with little ability to predict whether or not their
patents will stand.ea
Criticism
Patent Law, although being accepted and implemented in some form almost universally,
is not without its fair share of critics. Some of these criticisms are directed toward the
e2 McEniery. Information. suprq at 109. See also, Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175. 184 (1981), where the Court
confirmed the patentability ofcomputer software programs.
e3 Alice Corp. proprietqry Ltd. v. CLS Bank lnternationql, 134 S. Ct.2341 ,2354 (2014); Ass'nfor Molecular
pqtholog v. Myriad Genetics,,rc, 133 S. Ct.2107,2120 (2013); Mayo Collaborative servs., 132 s. ct. at 1289
(2012).
ea Shai Jalfin. 6 Yeqrs Lqter: The Effects ofthe Moyo Decision on Diagnostic Methods (2018),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/07/ 19/6-years-later-effects-mayo-decision-diagnostic-methods lid:992061
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philosophical foundations ofpatent law and others are focused on the more practical applications
while supporting the doctrine as a whole. The most staunch critics argue that patents actually
harm innovation, the very thing it purports to promote, by limiting access by others. These ideas
were advanced mostly by the proponents offree trade who believed that patents prioritized the
well-being ofthe few over the common good. These early critics believed that:
[Patents] projected an artificial idol ofthe single inventor, radically denigrated the role of
the intellectual commons, and blocked a path to this commons for other citizens 
-
citizens who were all, on this account, potential inventors too. [...] Patentees were the
equivalent of squatters on public land or better, of uncouth market traders who planted
their barrows in the middle of the highway and barred the way of the people.es
The opposition by these critics was moderately successful across Europe but primarily resulted
in reform and reorganization.e6
Some argue that patents have expanded too far. The concem is that there is "a trend of
oveneaching commoditization or propertization, where the boundaries of patent law have been
expanded too far" and the mechanisms designed to limit undeserving patents are inadequately
enflorced.eT This results in a surplus ofmonopolies, stifling competition and will not result in the
net societal gain intended which some argue occurred with software patents in the early part of
this century.e8 Some, like John Thomas, suggest that patents should be more concrete and the
current doctrine permits patents to "embrace the broadest reaches olhuman experience," and
perhaps there are some domains such as "swinging a golfclub, treating cancer or administering a
e5 Johns, Adrian: piracy, p. 273, citing W.R. Grove: Suggestions for Improvements in the Administration ofthe
patent Law, the Jurisin.i.6 (January28, lg60) 19-25 (online copy at Google Books), and B. Sherman, L. Bently:
The Making of Modern Intellectual Property Law (CUP 1999), 50-56
n6 Johns, Airian: piracy. The Intellectuil Property Wars from Gutenberg to Gates. The University ofChicago Press.
2009, IdBN 978-0- 226-40y8-s, p.248. The Netherlands abolished patents in 1869 (having established them in
l g l7j, and did not reintroduce them until t912. In Switzerland, criticism ofpatents delayed the introduction of
patent laws until 1907.
e7 McEniery, Information, supra al 127.
,t ii. i"" ui*, "rrttp.://alloypatentlaw.com/alloy-patent-law-ip-legal-blog/2017/6/2/patent-law-more-harm-than-good
20
mortgage" which should lie beyond the reach ofpatent law.ee Limiting patentable subject matter
so that it must involve physical matter or be a method of transforming such would effectively
"remove matters ofaesthetics, personal skill and human organization from the patent system."loo
Other practical critics argue that patents are almost worthless to all but the most wealthy
and most powerful.r0r First, the complexity and high cost ofobtaining a patent is prohibitive to
almost all individual inventors and even smaller businesses.l02 This issue is compounded when
considering that true worldwide coverage requires inventors to obtain six to ten patents in
different geographies.l0l Furthermore, having a patent may not be enough to bring a successful
product to market as other aspects ofthe product very well may fall under someone else's patent
and small entities may not have the bargaining power to eflectively negotiate licenses.roa
Second, patent rights are a sword, not a shield, and using that sword can be incredibly
costly. Enforcing a patent can cost millions ofdollars in legal fees and can take upwards of5
years.105 That is a tremendous gamble for an entity of limited resources, especially when there
are uncertainties such as those discussed above about whether or not a patent will hold up to
judicial review.r06 This amorlnts to a practical impossibility for all but the largest companies.
Some entities, known as patent trolls, don't produce any products. Instead, they simply sue
others using vague patents with the knowledge that almost all defendants will settle to avoid the
hefty costs oflitigation even though they have a good chance of winning. All ofthis amounts to
ee John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professioru,40 B.C. L. REV. I139, | 140 (1999); John R. Thomas,
The Post-lndustrial Patent System,l0 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 3 (1999).
r00 McEniery, lnformation, supra at 132.
rorTodd Hixon, For Most Small Companies Patents Are Just About Worthless,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/toddhixon/20 I 3/ l0/04/for-most-small-companies-patents-are-j ust-about-
worthless/#5bcafad83eR
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a huge financial undertaking for a set of rights that may never even be used. Many small entities
might be better off without filing.t0T
Analysis
Although justifications for the patent system have been primarily based on utilitarian
concepts throughout history, we will discuss why patent laws are wholly consistent with the
theory of natural law and, in fact, why natural law provides the most complete justification for
the patent system. First we will look at two of the more traditionally applied justifications,
utilitarianism and natural rights, and discuss why neither of these is the most coherent
justification available. Then we will look at the theory of natural law as articulated by John
Finnis and apply it to modem patent law concepts.
Utilitarianism
Traditionally, the United States Patent system, and many of the systems before it, have
been justified on utilitarian grounds.r0s In the United States, this is evidenced by the inclusion of
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution which declare its purpose "to promote the
progress of science and useful u6r.::l0e Furthermore, founding fathers like Thomas Jefferson
wrote that inventors could not inherently have rights to their inventions but, as an encouragement
to society to pursue useful ideas, they should have a right to the profits from such inventions.ll0
First, patent laws would provide the most utility to society because without such laws inventors
would fear imitation and keep their inventions secret. Second, the expectation that inventive
ventures will yield profits encourages people to invest their time and money. In both of these
rot 14.
ros Wendy Lim, Towards Developing a Natural Law Jurisprudence in the U.S. Patent System, l9 Santa Clara High
Technology Law Journal 561 (2003)
roe U.S. Const. art. I, $ 8, cl. 8.
rro Jefferson Writings l29l-92 (M' Peterson Ed' 1984)'
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scenarios, society benefits from disclosure of the invention itselfand the resulting acceleration of
economic progress.
The traditional utilitarian approach has a number offlaws though. First it does not weigh
the rights of the inventor in the analysis.lll Instead, the benefits to inventors are purely incidental
to the benefits that are sought for the common good. Under this approach, inventors are simply
lucky that the best approach for securing these societal benefits is to give a monopoly right to the
person who invented. Second, the idea that patents encourage disclosure and investment are
"tenuous, and at best, describe what happens most of the time."l12 Many inventions remain trade
secrets and many others only look toward patents when secrecy is impossible.lll As a practical
matter, it is nearly impossible to gather empirical evidence about what extent patents encourage
these behaviors or how many inventions would have otherwise been taken to inventors'
graves.l 14
The utilitarian approach also represents a problem in the sense that holding utility as the
absolute standard of moral judgments is a flawed approach. Most people who use this
justification, when pressed, may not actually hold lrue utilitarian ideals.r r5 Even though
historically this approach works for the very basic concepts of patent law, it is inadequate for
answering many ofthe questions that have arisen in patent law where the utilitarian value of
available outcomes is unpredictable.
ttt Lim. supra, at 572.
11? Id-
'rr Due largely to the tremendous time and financial investment that a patent might representtt4 Lim, supra, at 57l.
Ir5 Evidenced by the trolley problem hypotheticals
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Natural Rights
Proponents of natural rights theories generally bring forth the argument that "the rights of
inventors are of primary importance and the patent law exists to protect these rights, irrespective
of the consequences the grant of the patent would have on the public welfare."l16 Under a pure
natural rights argument:
[A] man has a natural property right in his own ideas, the appropriation of which b1'
another should be condemned as stealing. Society is morally obligated to recognize this
property right. Property is in essence exclusive, and therefore an exclusive privilege is the
only appropriate way for society to recognize this particular right.llT
John Locke argued that individuals were entitled to property rights because a creator is entitled
to the fruits of his labor.lr8 This theory was traditionally applied to physical property but could
be extended to intellectual property.t'' Another theory of natural property rights finds its basis in
the concept that inventions and ideas contain an expression of personality and thus are an
extension of the inventor's personhood, over which they have certain degree of control. 120
The main criticisms of the natural rights arguments are how the theory deals with the
limitations to these rights that are inherent to the patent system. First, natural property rights
should not be subject to a term limitation like patents are.tzt Second, natural rights does n,ot
accommodate for independent creation.l" Why should a second inventor who creates a thLe same
technology without knowledge of the first inventor not also be entitled to the same rightsll These
distinctions cannot be reconciled in a purely natural property justification. By solely accounting
for the property rights of the inventor and not the duties to society, natural rights theory has
116 Chisum, Nard, Schwartz, Newman & Kiei Principles of Patent Law vi' (2d Ed' 2001)'
r17 Edith Tilton penrose, The Economics Of The lnternational Patent System 32 (1953).
r18 Lim, supra, at 577 .
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overemphasized one side ofwhat should be a delicate balance. This theory then, on its own is
insufficient as ajustification for patent law.
Natural Law
Natural Law theory offers a comprehensive justification for patent law that recognizes
both individual rights and societal duties while providing a moral framework for making
decisions consistent with the principles ofpractical reasonableness. For our purposes, the main
tenets of natural law theory is that law should stem from morality and that morality is derived
objectivety from nature and is universal. Natural laws exists in the universe, whether we are
aware ofthem or not.
According to John Finnis, there are a number of lundamental goods which sit at the very
core of natural law theory.l23 These seven basic goods are; life, knowledge, play, aesthetic
experience, friendship, and religion.r2a These self-evident goods are the fundamental principles
that humans seek out and are the building blocks that make up all olthe other goods in nature.
All positive qualities in life can trace their origins to one or more ofthese seven principles.
All ofour actions should serve to promote the basic goods and how we decide to act
should be determined in accordance with practical reasonableness. The principle is critically
important in the legal context where the principles of natural law have to bridge the gap to be
effectively applied as positive law. Practical reasonableness is the principle that allows us to
maximize our participation in the goods. While it is itself a basic good, practical reasonableness
helps us to structure our lives and choose what good we are going to pursue every day. In order
I23 John Finnis. Narural Lqw and Natural Rights (1980).
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to act in accordance with practical reasonableness in one's personal life one should follow
Frnnrs s nrne requlrements. ''"
A Coherent Plan
The nine factors ofpractical reasonableness are intenelated and, like the threads
ofa fabric, give each other strenglh and context. A coherent plan is one that is consistent with the
other principles of practical reasonableness which are all aspects ofa coherent life plan. Acting
with a rational tife ptan means viewing life as one whole.126 It is not reasonable to live moment
to moment or to pursue projects with a set of simple and defined objectives.l2T Patent law, then,
should not be a simple reward system for invention and should be a careful and comprehensive
guide for promoting the basic goods.
While some laws relate directly to a basic good, the majority simply help bring order to a
society so that the people who live in it are better able to pursue the goods. Any law that does
this while abiding by the principles ofpractical reason is a moral law. If we believe that patent
law promotes technological innovation, then every one of the seven basic goods is inherently
implicated because a technologically advanced society should, at least in theory, be more capable
of promoting the basic goods than a society that is not. However, patent law does have a close
relationship with the basic goods ofknowledge and, now more than ever, life.
N o Ar b itr ar:t P r e.fe r e nc e A mong V alue s/ P e r s o ns
Knowledge, like all of the seven basic goods, is intrinsically good. The value of
knowledge, in a moral sense, does not stem from its usefulness, which is a stark contrast to the
patent system's hard utility requirements. However, this difference is precisely why the patent
t2s Id.
126 Id- at lo4
t27 Id. at 103
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system can simultaneously limit the use of technology and yet remain consistent with Finnis's
principles ofpractical reasonableness. As discussed above, subject matter limitations prevent
someone from obtaining a patent on laws ofnature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas. These
limitations effectively draw a line between the concepts of invention and discovery, and prevent
someone from profiting on something that is inherently part of the intellectual commons.
As technology progresses, new concepts and tools are devised that challenge our existing
ideas about what an invention is and the common law courts are left with the task ofdeciphering
and drawing the lines between what is or isn't patentable. This evaluation happened for method
patents in the industrial revolution and again for software patents during the tech boom of the
late nineties and early 2000's. A natural law critique would point out how, while the biotech
industry explodes, there is a tremendous amount ofconfusion about what is patentable and how
inventors in these fields are facing difficulties while seeking protection for their investments. In
addition one might point out that, during the early days ofthe tech boom, similar issues resulted
in many underserving software patents being granted, which has caused its fair share ofchaos.l28
The laws are hardly clear, coherent, or stable enough that people can use the law as a guide.
These criticisms are valid, however, they are administrative concems that are distinct from the
question ofwhether or not the technology should be patented. That does not make them any less
deserving ofour attention but it also doesn't disqualiff the principles on which patent law was
built.
Patent law's strict requirements ofutility, novelty, and non-obviousness are constantly
chipping away at what is actually patentable. These strictures, when appropriately applied. do a
r28,.patents were awarded on software at a furious rate in the early part ofthis century. Often, the actual innovation
was minimal, and the resulting monopoly hurt legitimate competition." (httDs://allovpatentlaw.com/alloy-patent-
law-ip-legal-blo920 I 7/6/2/oatent-law-more-harm-than-eood).
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goodjob ofexcluding undeserving, and thus ineligible, subject matter. This means that patents
are only being awarded for what amounts to very narrow uses of technology. Collectively, these
restrictions ensure that inventors are not profiting from anlthing more than what they actually
created. Therelore the resulting patent only monopolizes the knowledge that he himself brought
to the table.
Furthermore, an inventor cannot obtain a monopoly rights unless he fully discloses how
to make and use the invention. There are two "classes" ofpersons; inventors and the rest of the
public. The quid pro quo nature ofpatent law guarantees that the interests oleither class is not
favored to detriment ofthe other. In exchange for the economic benefit the inventor must share
the knowledge ofhow his invention works with the pubtic. The pubtic is free to do research with
this knowledge and may even seek further patents on improvements to the ideas. The inventor
does not own the ideas, he simply has the temporary right to profit from them. In this way the
amount ofknowledge available in the public domain increases every time an inventor seeks a
patent. This effect is only compounded if we believe that patent laws are effectively encouraging
further invention. It stands to reason then, that patent law promotes the basic good of knowledge
by encouraging and creating a marketplace of ideas.
Life, according to Finnis, is more than simply an altemative to death or merely the
opposite of inanimate objects. Promoting the basic good of human life and dignity means
maintaining our mental and physical wellbeing as well as preventing the destruction of life.
While the offrcial USPTO policy is that that the office will not allow any patents that are directed
to human organisms and the United States govemment has otherwise explicitly outlawed human
cloning, questions remain about will happen with the technology in these areas that is
continuously advancing.
28
Here, there is a great potential for the use ofgenetic engineering to develop treatments
that can greatly reduce human suffering. On the other hand, many worry that propriety of
modified genes may lead to number ethical as wel[ as socio-economic issues. The human
genome was successfully sequenced in 2003, and since then many have tried to patent segments
of the human genome.l2e The Supreme Court invalidated these gene patents in 2013, however,
that was on the $ounds that the human genes were a product ofnature and thus were not patent
eligible subject matter.
The door for patenting genetically modihed organisms has been open since the 1980's
with the decision in Diamond vs. Chakabarty. Technologies like CRISPR gene editing are fairly
accessible for even amateur scientists which means experimentation in this area is cheap. It is
inevitable that we will see a time when it is possible to create custom genes and splice them into
embryos. Nothing currently prevents the USPTO from awarding patents on human DNA
sequences that have been altered by humans. Ifthese altered genes could be implanted into a
human embryo, would the inventor of the gene sequence have an ownership interest that person?
The technology makes possible practices that resemble eugenics but it also has great potential to
eliminate many forms of suffering. Specific exclusions from the category ofpatentable subject
matter offer some protection for the sanctity ofhuman life, however as this technology
progresses we may have a duty to amend the law to further protect the good of life.
De t ac hme nt/C o mmi t m e nt
A coherent plan demonstrates a commitment to promote one or more of the basic goods.
While commitment is crucial, one must not be so committed to any one principle that they fatl
r2e Prior to being invafidated by the ruling in Associationfor Molecular Pathologt v. Myriad Cenetics, lnc.. more
than 4,300 human genes had been patented. (https://ghr.nlm.nih.sov/Drimer/testins/qenepatents)l see also
Intellectual Proper4., and Genozics (httos://www. senome.gov/ I 901 6590/intellectual-oroperty/).
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into a fanatical pursuit ofone value or project while ignoring the other basic goods and nine
principles of practical reasonableness. Patent law seeks to facilitate the "progress ofscience and
the useful arts" and thus promotes the basic good ofknowledge. It does not, however, recklessly
promote knowledge without regard for its effect on society. That kind of system might simply
provide tremendous reward for every invention or innovation. In reality the law is careful
balancing act between the interests ofinventors and those ofsociety as a whole. That balancing
act is the practical manifestation of the principles of commitment and detachment.
Effi c i e nc:t ll' i t hi n Re a s o n
Similarly, a rational law will take into account the costs and benefits without ignoring the
other principles. This lactor requires a sort ofcost-benefit analysis of the chosen path and also of
the alternative methods lor we should strive to achieve the most good for the least cost without
straying into a strict utilitarian or consequentialist framework.r30 Ifthe critics ofpatent law are to
be believed, this is possibly the weakest factor for the American patent system. However, these
criticisms are speculative at best when it comes to the relative benefit ofalterative systems. The
balance of interests discussed above is reasonably calculated to benefit to all parties involved.
The system is striving to be a non-zero-sum game and the costs of this game are generally
outweighed by the collective benefits.
Respect for Eve\t Value
One ofthe dangers of a strictly utilitarian approach is that one could justify a law that
directly damages one ofthe basic goods so long as the collective benefit "outweighs" the harm
caused.13l A truly reasonable law does not directly attack any basic value. It can never promote a
basic good at the direct cost ofanother. One might argue that patented technologies have done
r30 John Finnis, Natural Low qnd Natural Rights (1980) at l12.
t3t [d. at ll9
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plenty of harm over the years and thus patent law has contributed to the harm. As Finnis states,
the unsought and unavoidable consequences that accompany every human choice are
incalculable.l32 We cannot take all olthese consequences into account. Especially in the patent
context because technology is a tool and therefore is inherently neutral. Patent law does not
directly damage any ofthe basic goods.
The Common Good
This factor is straightforward. Rational and coherent laws should have a priority
of favoring and fostering the common good of one's communities.l33 The United States
Constitution states that Congress shall have the power "to promote the progress ofscience and
useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries.'l3a This short passage conveys that the primary intention of
the law is to encourage the advancement ofscience and technology. The method olachieving
this goal is by giving limited exclusive rights to inventors. The benefit to individuals is purely
incidental as it is the means by which the ultimate goal is achieved. Patent law has benefited the
common good by creating a marketplace for ideas in which society has gained a repository of
technical knowledge.
Conscience
An inlormed conscience will consider each ofthese factors of practical reasonableness
and will make its practical judgement known via a "feeling."l3s An truly informed conscience
will choose what itjudges to be reasonable without regard to the "the sophistries which
132 [d.
t33 Id. at 125
I3a U.S. Const. art. I, $ 8, cI.8.
r35 John Finnis. Natural Lqw qnd Nqtural Rights (1980) at 125.
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intelligence so readily generates to rationalize indulgence, timeserving, and self-love."l36 Here, a
legislator armed with a reasonable and inlormed conscious would find that the American patent
law system complies with each of Finnis's principles ofpractical reasonableness and, therefore,
is a set of moral laws.
Conclusion
Despite the origin of American patent law coming from utilitarian justifications, natural
law theory provides the most comprehensive framework for analyzing the patent system.
Through its requirements ofnovelty, non-obviousness, utility and written description, patent law
recognizes the moral obligation to promote the basic goods, a duty to the common good ofthe
community, but also the inherent rights ofthe individual.
136 [d.
